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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper offers an alternative method of modeling the 
Time-Limited Dispatch (TLD) of aircraft.  Existing methods 
involve the use of fault tree analysis and Markov analysis with 
various simplifying assumptions.  Monte Carlo simulation 
(MCS) is the suggested alternative, which overcomes the 
problems associated with the other techniques, such as 
dependencies between basic events (fault tree analysis) or 
huge number of system states (Markov analysis).  The results 
obtained from the analysis of a simple example are compared 
for the existing modeling approaches and MCS. MCS is seen 
to have potential advantages, especially when modeling TLD 
for large, full scale systems. 
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
 
Introduced to commercial transport aircraft about 20 years 
ago, Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) 
systems govern engine thrust from the time fuel metering 
begins to the point of fuel shutoff.  Until the introduction of 
these electronic engine control systems hydromechanical 
control (HMC) systems were used.  In these applications of 
FADEC it was to be the first time that pilots would have no 
HMC systems available as backup in the event of an electronic 
system failure [1]. 
FADEC systems contain a certain level of redundancy, 
incorporating a dual channel control system.  This involves 
having two essentially identical channels per engine.  Each 
critical loop or function in the FADEC contains either 
redundant elements or dual systems.  Despite this redundancy, 
the dispatch criteria imposed after the introduction of FADEC 
were overly restrictive, increasing the numbers of delays and 
cancellations of flights [2].  This was due to the occurrence of 
independent faults in more than one channel.  Because levels 
of reliability are higher for FADEC systems than for HMC 
systems an opportunity existed to use available redundancy to 
allow dispatch with faults present.  This would still allow 
airworthiness standards to be met and also reduce the numbers 
of delays and cancellations, along with the added benefit of 
allowing better planning of maintenance operations.  This new 
approach, allowing degraded redundancy dispatch was named 
time-limited dispatch (TLD). 
 
2.  INTRODUCTION TO TLD 
 
TLD allows the dispatch of aircraft in the presence of one 
or more known faults whilst assuring a certain level of system 
reliability.  Depending on the significance of the faults aircraft 
may be dispatched for differing lengths of time.  These 
dispatch intervals give the maximum length of time that the 
aircraft may be dispatched with faults present before those 
faults must be addressed.  There are four categories of 
dispatch interval.  These are:  
o Do Not Dispatch (DND), 
o Short Time Dispatch (STD), 
o Long Time Dispatch (LTD), 
o Manufacturer/Operator Defined Dispatch (MDD). 
The implementation of the DND dispatch category means 
that the aircraft must not be dispatched because of the faults 
present and maintenance must be undertaken immediately.  
The STD dispatch category allows dispatch in the short-term 
and the LTD category for a relatively longer time before 
repairs are carried out.  The final category of dispatch, MDD, 
is reserved for faults falling into none of the other three 
categories and not affecting the loss of thrust control (LOTC) 
rate [2].  An upper limit for the LOTC rate of 100 events per 
106 flight hours (flt. hrs.) is given by the FAA for dispatchable 
system configurations.  The maximum average LOTC rate of 
the system must not exceed 10 events per 106 flt. hrs.  This 
level matches that which was achieved by the HMC systems 
superceded by FADEC. 
 
2.1  Maintenance Strategies 
 
Two strategies exist that may be used to maintain the 
FADEC systems of aircraft when TLD is applied.  The first of 
these is minimum equipment list (MEL) maintenance [2], 
which would normally be used on STD category faults.  The 
exact time of occurrence of any fault maintained using this 
approach must be known.  As the fault occurs a ‘countdown’ 
of the dispatch time is initiated.  The fault must be remedied, 
at the latest, by the time the countdown reaches zero.  Figure 1 
illustrates this process.  The fault occurs at time t1, after which 
the dispatch interval is initiated.  At the end of the countdown, 
at t2, the fault must be repaired, if the repair has not already 
been implemented. 
The second maintenance strategy used is periodic 
inspection/repair (PIR), which involves checking the system 
for faults at regular intervals.  This is most often used to 
maintain faults in the LTD category.  Unlike MEL 
maintenance PIR does not require knowledge of the exact time 
of occurrence of the fault.  Faults, discovered at inspections, 
are assumed to occur at the midpoint of consecutive 
inspections [2].  This is considered reasonable since the fault 
will, on average, occur at this time, assuming the failure rates 
for faults are constant with time and the periodic inspection 
interval is less than the mean time between failures (MTBF) of 
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the sum of failure rates in that category.  The dispatch interval 
is then deemed to have begun at the midpoint of the 
inspections and the allowable period of dispatch after the 
inspection is calculated.  This maintenance strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  I1 and I2 represent two consecutive 
inspections.  A fault, occurring at time tf, is discovered at I2 
and assumed to occur at t1.  If the dispatch interval is assumed 
to begin at this time the aircraft may be dispatched until time 
t2, giving an allowable period of dispatch of time T at I2.  In 
practice the inspection interval for a fault category must not 
exceed twice the dispatch interval for faults of that category.  
This ensures that the average exposure to faults does not 
exceed the dispatch interval. 
If PIR is used to maintain faults of more than one dispatch 
category a situation can occur where a fault is discovered at an 
inspection for faults of a different category.  In this case the 
fault could be treated as if found for the first time at the next 
inspection for faults of its own dispatch category.  In this way 
a STD fault discovered at a LTD inspection could be treated as 
if discovered at the next inspection for STD faults [2]. 
Due to the different approaches involved in the MEL and 
PIR maintenance strategies the maximum possible exposure 
time of the system to faults will differ.  In MEL the maximum 
possible exposure time is equal to the dispatch interval, but in 
PIR the maximum possible exposure time is equal to twice the 
dispatch interval. 
There is a  possibility that more than one fault may exist 
within a FADEC system at any one time.  In such cases these 
faults may be repaired in a number of different ways.  Below 
are some examples of the situations that may arise, along with 
some of the maintenance possibilities. 
Figure 3 depicts the occurrence of two faults, A and B.  If 
these faults were to be maintained using MEL maintenance 
dispatch intervals for these faults would end at t1 and t2 
respectively.  Upon reaching the end of the first dispatch 
interval, at t1, a number of strategies are possible.  At this 
point fault A must be addressed to allow further dispatch.  
Fault B may also be repaired at this time, allowing dispatch 
until another TLD fault occurs.  Alternatively, fault B may be 
left in the system and the aircraft may be dispatched until its 
associated dispatch interval ends at time t2. 
In the situation just described it may be that with the 
simultaneous occurrence of faults A and B a reduction in the 
dispatch interval is specified.  This scenario is depicted in 
Figure 4, again for the case of MEL maintenance.  In this case 
faults A and B, when occurring alone, bring about the 
initiation of LTD intervals, which would end at t1 and t2 as 
before.  However, when both faults are present within the 
system the dispatch interval is reduced to STD.  Thus, as fault 
B occurs the STD interval ending at t3 is initiated, rather than 
the one ending at t2.  Upon reaching t3 three maintenance 
strategies exist.  These are: 
o Repair both faults, A and B, allowing unlimited 
dispatch of the aircraft, 
o Repair fault A only, allowing dispatch until t2, at 
which point fault B must be repaired, 
o Repair fault B only, allowing dispatch until t1, at 
which point fault A must be repaired. 
When faults combine in this manner to reduce the 
dispatch interval it is possible for the ordering of the faults to 
also play a part.  It may be the case that the dispatch interval 
would be reduced when either A was followed by B or B was 
followed by A.  However, another possibility is that the 
dispatch interval may only be reduced if A is followed by B 
but not if B is followed by A. 
The situations occurring above may also arise when PIR 
maintenance is being used to maintain the FADEC system.  
However, the reduction or otherwise of the dispatch intervals 
can be more complex, since the exact time of occurrence of 
the faults is not known.  As an example of this increased 
complexity consider Figure 5, which shows the occurrence of 
two faults A and B.  Each of these faults has an associated 
LTD interval and LTD faults are to be maintained using PIR.  
In combination the faults A and B initiate a STD interval.  In 
the figure I1 and I2 represent two consecutive PIR inspections.  
At inspection I2 faults A and B are discovered and assumed to 
have occurred at the midpoint of the two inspections, t1.  A 
LTD interval initiated at this time allows dispatch of the 
aircraft for a time T after inspection I2.  However, if the 
simultaneous existence of faults A and B causes the initiation 
of a STD interval ending at t3 the situation is complicated 
somewhat.  Upon reaching the maintenance deadline at t3 
faults A and B, fault A alone or fault B alone could be repaired.  
If A and B are both repaired the aircraft may be dispatched 
indefinitely.  If just fault A or fault B is repaired the aircraft 
may then be dispatched until t2 when the remaining fault must 
be repaired. 
These examples of situations that may arise when 
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implementing TLD to FADEC systems by no means cover all 
possibilities.  They merely highlight some of the many cases 
that must be considered when attempting to model TLD. 
 
3.  MODELING TLD 
 
Before applying TLD to aircraft it is important to be sure 
that the aircraft will still conform to the levels of safety 
desired of it.  The first step in demonstrating this conformity is 
to construct a mathematical model of the system in order to 
predict its behavior when TLD is used.  In [1] and [3] two of 
the commonly-used methods of TLD analysis are presented – 
a fault tree-based approach and a Markov modeling approach.  
These approaches are demonstrated here for the simple system 
shown in Figure 6.  Monte Carlo simulation is then applied to 
the same system.  The system is that given as an example in 
[1] and consists of two units, U1 and U2.  These have failure 
rates per hour of λU1 = 0.0002 and λU2 = 0.0001 respectively. 
 
3.1  Time-Weighted Average (TWA) Fault Tree Approach 
 
In this method the overall average failure rate of the 
system is obtained by adding the failure rates of the HMC 
faults, λHMC, and the uncovered faults, λUC,  to a time-
weighted average (TWA) of the failure rates of the system 
from each of its dispatchable configurations, i.e. 
,LLTD,LTDLSTD,STDLFU,FUUCHMCTWA λλλλλλ ttt ++++=  (1) 
where λTWA is the TWA failure rate of the system.  tFU, tSTD 
and tLTD are respectively the fractions of time spent in the full-
up, STD and LTD dispatchable system configurations.  λFU,L is 
the LOTC rate of the system from the FU state to LOTC.  
λSTD,L and λLTD,L are the average LOTC rates with STD and 
LTD faults.  If the system has n dispatchable configurations, 
let state i = 1 represent the full-up configuration (i.e. the state 
with no failed components).  States i = 2,…m and 
i = m + 1,…,n will represent the STD and LTD dispatchable 
system configurations respectively.  If λi,L is the failure rate to 
LOTC for the ith configuration it may be calculated as follows.  
The failure probability (of LOTC) for each state is divided by 
a suitable time period, such as the average flight time, to 
obtain a probability per flight hour.  This is then equated to the 
average failure rate to LOTC over the time interval [2].  Thus 
,
flt
L,
L, t
Qi
i =λ       (2) 
where Qi,L is the failure probability (of LOTC) for state i and 
tflt is the average flight time.  Define TSTD and TLTD as the 
lengths of time spent in the STD and LTD dispatchable system 
states before repair, i.e. the STD and LTD dispatch intervals.  
If λi is the failure rate into a failed dispatchable system state 
then the fractions of time spent in the STD and LTD 
dispatchable system configurations may be approximated as 
follows (see[3]): 
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The fraction of time spent in the full-up state, tFU, is 
determined using the fact that the fraction of time spent in the 
failed states added to the fraction of time in full-up state will 
be unity.  Therefore once the fractions of time spent in all the 
failed states is known, tFU may be calculated as follows: 
.1 LTDSTDFU ttt −−=      (4) 
The average LOTC rates with STD and LTD faults are defined 
in [3] as: 
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The dual unit system shown in Figure 6 has three 
dispatchable configurations, numbered states 1 to 3 as follows: 
1. U1 and U2 work (Full-up),  
2. U1 is failed, U2 works (STD), 
3. U1 works, U2 is failed (LTD). 
If qU1 and qU2 represent the probabilities of failure of U1 and 
U2 then, substituting these into equation (2), we get: 
.,,
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Substituting these into equation (3) we obtain the fractions of 
time spent in the STD and LTD dispatchable system 
configurations: 
,, LTD
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which may then be substituted into (4) to give the fraction of 
time spent in the full-up state: 
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Substituting (6), (7) and (8) into (1) gives λTWA for this dual 
unit system.  If the failure probabilities qUi are given by: 
,1 flttUi Uieq
λ−
−=       (9) 
then λTWA can be calculated for different values of TSTD and 
TLTD, which are the dispatch intervals for U1 and U2 
respectively.  The flight time, tflt, was assumed to be 5 hours.  
 
3.2  Single Fault State Markov Approach 
 
Like the fault tree approach, this technique has several 
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Figure 5.  Faults Acting in Combination – PIR 
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Figure 6.  A Dual Unit System 
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attractive features [1].  For instance, Markov modeling makes 
direct use of failure and repair rates, negating the need to 
equate the failure rates to probability/flight hour, as is the case 
with the fault tree approach.  The main drawback with Markov 
analysis is the potentially huge number of system states that 
may be present within the model [4].  For this reason [3] 
considers failures that lead to one final failed state 
representing LOTC.  This failed state is absorbing, since once 
the system is in this state no transition may occur to any other 
state.  However, in [3] an artificial feedback loop, a “simulated 
repair”, is introduced that takes the system from the final 
failed state back to the full-up state with no components failed.  
It is argued that a steady-state solution for the average failure 
rate of the system is required but that without a feedback loop 
the steady-state probability of the system being failed will 
always approach a value of 1.  In [3] this simulated repair rate 
is set to unity, for simplicity.  This choice is arbitrary, made 
since, if a LOTC event occurs for an engine, the control must 
be repaired before the next flight takes place.  A repair interval 
of one hour is deemed suitable.  This method also differs from 
a conventional Markov technique in that it involves only lower 
order fault states, commonly only single-fault states, although 
dual fault states are included if important for the analysis.  The 
Markov model obtained using this technique is like that in 
Figure 7.  The transition rates from the full-up state to the STD 
and LTD fault states are λSTD and λLTD and the corresponding 
repair rates are νSTD and νLTD.  In [3] λSTD and λLTD are 
approximated by the sums of the failure rates of all of the STD 
and LTD type faults respectively.  νSTD and νLTD are given by 
the reciprocal of the dispatch intervals, TSTD and TLTD.  The 
failure rates from the STD and LTD fault states are given by 
λSTD,L and λLTD,L and the simulated repair is given by νFB.  The 
Markov model leads to a system of 4 linear differential 
equations, given by: 
,AQQ =?      (10) 
where A is the transition rate matrix, 
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and 
[ ],,,,Q LOTCLTDSTDFU QQQQ=     (12) 
where QFU, QSTD, QLTD and QLOTC are the probabilities of the 
system being in the full-up, STD, LTD and LOTC states 
respectively.  At steady state the derivatives of these 
probabilities will be zero, i.e. 
,0AQ =       (13) 
and thus a system of 4 linear equations is obtained.  This 
system of equations is dependent.  In order to obtain a system 
of independent equations one of the equations is replaced by 
the condition that the sum of the probabilities of being in each 
state is unity, i.e. 
.1LOTCLTDSTDFU =+++ QQQQ    (14) 
Column 1 of A is arbitrarily chosen to be replaced by (14), 
giving a system of equations that is solved to find Q at steady 
state.  In order to find the LOTC rate for the system the 
average transition rate into the LOTC state is considered [3].  
This LOTC rate, obtained from the single fault state Markov 
model is: 
,
state LOTCin  being ofy Probabilit1
state LOTC into flowy Probabilit
Mkv
−
=λ   (15) 
At this point faults that are required to be modeled as leading 
directly to the LOTC state, i.e. HMC faults or uncovered 
electronic faults, are added.  Since these faults could lead to 
LOTC from any non-LOTC state the sum of their failure rates 
is multiplied by the sum of the probabilities of being in all the 
states except the LOTC state [3].  Thus (15) becomes: 
( )( )
LOTC
LLTD,LTDLSTD,STDUCHMCLTDSTDFU
Mkv 1 Q
λQλQλλQQQ
−
+++++
=λ .(16) 
When modeling the dual unit system shown in Figure 6 the 
failure rates for the single fault state Markov model may be 
calculated as they were for the TWA model. 
Markov models of TLD all inherently model the MEL 
maintenance strategy.  This is because as soon as a component 
of the system fails the system will make a transition to a 
different state and thus the failure time of the component will 
be known.  If PIR is to be used as a maintenance approach the 
maximum allowed dispatch time calculated using a Markov 
approach is doubled in order to calculate the maximum 
periodic inspection interval. 
 
3.3  Conventional Markov Approach to Single Fault State 
Model 
 
Note that the LOTC rate obtained from the single fault 
state Markov model, λMkv, is dependent on the value of the 
feedback rate, νFB, and independent of the initial conditions of 
the system.  Andrews and Moss [4] detail a method of finding 
the asymptotic failure rate of a system with absorbing final 
failed states.  This may be applied to the Markov model 
described in the previous section.  In this case there is no need 
to include a simulated repair from the final fully-failed state, 
i.e. the feedback rate, νFB.  Thus the transition rate matrix is:  ( )
( )
( ) 







+−
+−
+−
=
0000
0
0
0
A
LLTD,LLTD,LTDLTD
LSTD,LSTD,STDSTD
LTDSTDLTDSTD
λλνν
λλνν
λλλλ
 (17) 
The reduced transition rate matrix, Am, is obtained by 
truncating A by deleting entries for the absorbing states.  Thus 
the final row and column of (17) is deleted to get Am.  The 
asymptotic failure rate, λASY, is then given by:  
LOTC 
λSTD,L 
λLTD,L 
λLTD 
λSTD 
νSTD 
νLTD 
νFB 
 
Figure 7.  Single Fault State Markov Diagram. 
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where the element of the reduced transition rate matrix in the 
ith row and jth column is defined as ai,j and QFU(0), QSTD(0) and 
QLTD(0) are the initial probabilities of being in the FU, STD 
and LTD system states.  Therefore, note that in this case the 
solution is dependent on the initial conditions of the system. 
 
 3.4  Monte Carlo Simulation Method 
 
Performing a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) involves 
constructing and using a computer model of the system under 
investigation.  This model is based on a structured, logical 
system representation and contains a set of rules that describe 
the response of the system to events that occur to it during its 
lifetime [4].  These events may be component repairs, failures 
or sequences of failures or, in this case, events that will lead to 
the implementation of TLD and its subsequent maintenance 
deadlines.  In fact, any event may be added to the model 
subject to the complexity of the software used.  MCS requires 
the generation of a uniform set of random numbers.  These 
random numbers are then used to generate times of component 
failures by using the relevant failure distribution associated 
with each component.  In the simulation code constructed 
during the course of this work the numbers generated are, in 
fact, pseudo-random.  The system simulation may then be run 
many times, making a note after each simulation of any 
parameters of interest, and continuing the simulations until the 
required tolerance is reached for these parameters.  In the 
work presented here the parameter of interest that had to be 
obtained from the system was its failure rate.  Each simulation 
is carried out until a suitable point in time, whether this be the 
lifetime of the system or the time at which the system fails.  
The algorithm for the main module of the simulation program 
used in this work is given in Figure 8. 
When modeling a system on which TLD will be applied 
the correct scheduling of all occurring events is of great 
importance.  In the MCS code used here the component failure 
times are initially generated and added to an array that holds a 
reference to the component, along with the time that its failure 
will occur.  A reference is also kept of the order of all the 
events in the schedule and this is updated as events are 
removed from, or added to, the schedule. 
As component failures occur in the simulation a list of 
TLD criteria is checked to see if the failure of this component 
will initiate, either on its own or in combination with other 
component failures, the implementation of a TLD deadline.  If 
this is the case the deadline itself is then added to the schedule 
along with its time of occurrence, which varies according to 
the dispatch category for that particular failure or combination 
of failures. 
In each simulation loop the first event chronologically is 
removed from the schedule and the simulation time is 
advanced to time of this event.  If this time exceeds the 
maximum lifetime of the system the simulation ends 
immediately.  Otherwise, if the event is a component failure, 
the status of the system is updated and if the system fails the 
simulation ends.  If the event is a maintenance deadline the 
appropriate repairs are carried out to components according to 
the maintenance strategies being applied to the system.  In the 
case of the system being modeled here this simply means 
repairing the unit that failed to cause the maintenance 
deadline. Finally, if the event is a periodic inspection, a 
maintenance deadline will be added to the schedule at the 
appropriate point in time. 
In the MCS code a number of other assumptions are 
made.  These are: 
o The maximum lifetime of the system is set to be 
read system logic, component failure and repair 
distributions and TLD combinations from file 
input TLD options 
set max_sim_time 
total_sim_time = 0, total_fail = 0, failure_rate = 0 
while (failure rate has converged) 
{ 
marker for simulation failure initialized: flag = 0 
initial component failures added to empty schedule 
while (current_sim_ time ≤ max_sim_ time) 
{ 
current_sim_time = time of 1st event in schedule 
remove 1st event from schedule 
if (1st event is a component failure) 
{ 
update the status of the system 
if (system fails due to this component failure)
{ 
simulation failed: flag = 1 
end this simulation 
} 
if (TLD interval initiated due to this failure) 
{ 
add maintenance deadlines to schedule 
} 
else if (1st event is a maintenance deadline) 
{ 
implement repairs according to maintenance 
strategy 
} 
else if (1st event is a periodic inspection) 
{ 
add maintenance deadline to schedule 
} 
} 
total_sim_time = total_sim_time + current_sim_time 
total_fail = total_fail + flag 
failure_rate = total_fail / total_sim_time 
check for convergence of failure rate 
}
 
Figure 8.  The Algorithm for the Main Module of 
the MCS. 
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200000 flight hours.  This corresponds to a lifetime of 
about 37 years for a system used for 15 hours of flight per 
day, or 55 years for a system used for 10 hours per day. 
o The length of a flight is 5 hours.  This was chosen 
since this was used in the example in [1] when a flight 
length is needed for the TWA modeling approach. 
o Maintenance operations and inspections cannot occur 
mid-flight.  Thus, for any events of this type whose 
occurrence time is calculated to occur in flight, the time of 
the event is moved to the beginning of that flight.  This is 
a conservative approach to this problem. 
It should be noted that, despite the fact that they have been 
used in order to model this particular system, these 
assumptions may be easily changed within the MCS code, if 
necessary.  The code may also be easily applied to other 
systems.  This is because the system upon which the 
simulation is to be implemented is supplied to the code in a 
representation of the form of its fault tree.  Other system-
specific information supplied to the code is the failure 
distribution of each component, along with its associated 
parameters. 
The failure rate of the system was actually calculated after 
every 1000 simulations.  Results were obtained to an accuracy 
of 2 decimal places (for a failure rate given in units of number 
of failures per 106 flt. hrs.). If the failure rate matched over 10 
consecutive calculations convergence was assumed. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
Results were obtained using each of the above modeling 
approaches for differing intervals of dispatch for each unit in 
the dual unit example.  The dispatch interval for U1 (STD) is 
represented as D1 and the dispatch interval for U2 (LTD) as 
D2.  The MCS code was used to model all possible 
maintenance strategies for the dual unit system, with U1 and 
U2 being maintained using MEL and/or PIR.  The PIR 
maintenance strategy was simulated with differing inspection 
intervals, incrementally from 0.25 to 2 times the length of the 
dispatch interval.  
Results are shown in Figure 9 for a value of D1=100 flt. 
hrs. as was chosen in [1].  Presented in this way it can be seen 
that the results obtained from all of the methods are similar.  
The results obtained using the TWA approach give an 
overestimation of the failure rate in comparison to the other 
approaches, and each of the MCS models gives similar results 
to the Markov model, which is acknowledged to be the more 
accurate of the two approaches presented in [1] and [3].  
Figure 10 shows the same results presented as a percentage 
difference from the results of the single fault state Markov 
approach.  The TWA results grow from 7.1% above those of 
the single fault state Markov to 16.4% as D2 increases from 
100 to 500 flt. hrs.  All of the simulation results lie within 4% 
of the single fault state Markov results for D1 = 100 flt. hrs.  
As D1 increases from 100 to 500 flt. hrs. the simulation results 
remain close to the single fault state Markov results.  
However, as D1 rises the simulation results become 
progressively larger in comparison to the single fault state 
Markov results.  Indeed, when D1 = 500 flt. hrs. the results 
from all of the simulations are greater than the results single 
faults state model, by as much as 5.95%.  A trend that is also 
observed from the simulation results is that, for the most part, 
the system failure rate is observed to be higher for the case 
where both units are maintained using PIR than when one is 
repaired using PIR and one using MEL.  The system failure 
rates when both units are maintained using MEL is the lowest 
obtained from all of the maintenance strategies and tend to lie 
closest to the single fault state Markov results.  These results 
are as would be expected for this simple system.  It should be 
noted that, for this simple dual unit system, all of the modeling 
approaches bar TWA give a similar allowable dispatch time 
for the remaining unit, given a dispatch time for one of the 
units, assuming that a failure rate of 10 failures per 106 flt. hrs. 
must not be exceeded. 
Note that the results obtained for the single fault state 
Markov model with an artificial feedback loop are, for this 
system, very close to those achieved by using the conventional 
Markov approach to modeling the single fault state model with 
initial condition that the system starts in the full-up state, i.e. 
both units work initially. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Each of the methods applied to the dual unit system 
brings with it both advantages and disadvantages, some of the 
main examples of which are shown in Table 1.  The MCS 
method proves to be a match for existing techniques for the 
simple dual unit system considered.  However, the slight 
differences in system failure rate observed between the MCS 
and the single fault state Markov could grow larger as the 
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Figure 10.  Percentage Difference from Single Fault 
State Markov – D1=100 flt. hrs. 
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Figure 9.  Comparison of Methods – D1=100 flt. hrs. 
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system being modeled becomes more complex.  Preliminary 
work to investigate this theory, in which a slightly more 
complex system is modeled, suggests the difference between 
the techniques is greater than for the dual unit system. 
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Method Advantages Disadvantages 
TWA fault 
tree 
Clear auditable representation of system failure logic. TLD introduces dependencies between the basic 
events, which are inappropriate for a conventional 
fault tree approach. 
Failure rates approximated from failure probabilities. 
single fault 
state 
Markov/ 
conventional 
Markov 
Overcome problems associated with dependencies in 
the system. 
Failure and repair rates are easily incorporated into the 
model. 
Only the MEL maintenance strategy is modeled.  
Constant failure rates are required. 
Model grows exponentially and becomes increasingly 
difficult to audit as the number of system states 
increases (conventional model). 
Involves an approximation of the system, reducing the 
number of system states and ignoring many 
combinations of faults (single fault state only). 
MCS Dependencies, non-constant failure rates and (ordered) 
combinations of faults are easily dealt with. 
PIR and MEL maintenance are easily modeled, 
including different strategies for different dispatch 
categories, e.g. STD-MEL, LTD-PIR. 
Uses fault tree representation of the system, which 
brings the associated advantage of clarity of 
system failure logic representation. 
More information may be obtained from the model than 
with other methods – e.g. could identify faults with 
inappropriate dispatch intervals. 
Initial generation of code may be time-consuming – 
however, the code can be used for many systems. 
Extra CPU time required to run many simulations – 
however, in comparison to the time taken 
designing a new aircraft and gaining certification 
this will be negligible. 
 
Table 1.  Advantages and Disadvantages of the Different Modeling Techniques. 
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